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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Traditionally it has been assumed that rms maximise prots. However in the pres-
ence of market distortions, it is not typically the case that owners will wish rms
to maximise prots. The usual justication for prot maximisation is the Fisher
Separation Theorem (see Milne (1974), Milne (1981)), which says that if there are
no externalities, the rm has no market power and nancial markets are complete,
all shareholders will wish to maximise the value of the rm. This result does not
apply if there are externalities between the rm and its shareholders. In this case,
shareholders will not just care about the e¤ect of rms decisions on their wealth but
will also care about the direct (externality) e¤ects of the decisions upon their utility.
For instance, a shareholder who lives near a factory with a smoking chimney, will
want less production than the prot maximising level and less production than one
who lives further away. Thus we see both disagreement between shareholders and
deviations from prot maximisation.
Although we use pollution as an example of an externality, it is not the most
important one. Another is the dislike that many people have from investing in rms,
which behave in socially irresponsible ways, such as supporting repressive regimes
or damaging the environment. Alternatively the externality could be interpreted
as private benets of control, perquisites (see Jensen & Meckling (1976)) or other
services not captured by market variables. These are the externalities discussed most
often in the corporate control literature. We suspect that these are important factors
in proxy ghts and takeover contests. Other examples are rm-specic investments
provided by workers or managers (see section 5).
If there is imperfect competition, the Fisher Separation Theorem breaks down
in two ways. Firstly, in general, there will be disagreement between di¤erent share-
holders about the policy of the rm. Secondly, typically, no shareholder will wish
to maximise prots. The Fisher Separation Theorem does not apply if there is im-
perfect competition, since in that case, a change in the rms production plan will
a¤ect prices as well as shareholderswealth. Prots are not well dened since there
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will be more than one price system in terms of which prots can be expressed. If the
rm changes its production plan typically a shareholders old budget set will not be
a subset of the new one and no unambiguous comparisons can be made.
As argued above, in the presence of market distortions, shareholder unanimity
cannot be guaranteed. However it is still the case that there are some decisions
on which all members of the control group will agree. Firstly we show that, under
some assumptions, for any plan which is not productively e¢ cient, there will be some
production plan which is unanimously preferred. Secondly, all members of the control
group will agree that the rm should produce less/more than the prot-maximising
level of negative/positive externalities. Thus conventional prot-maximising models
may have overstated the size of the distortions due to externalities. Thirdly if the
rm has monopoly power all will agree on the desirability of using a 2-part tari¤.
1.2 Modelling Firms Decisions
We consider an economy with externalities and/or monopoly. As we argue above,
there is a no unambiguous justication for assuming prot maximisation when mar-
kets are distorted. However, it is not clear what the alternative should be. At present
there is no widely accepted economic model of the internal decision-making of rms.
To resolve this we propose a relatively general model. Despite the generality, our
model is able to make a number of predictions concerning equilibrium behaviour.
The rm is modelled as a collection of individuals, each of whom is maximising
his/her utility. Decisions are made by a process of aggregating the preferences of a
group of decision-makers within the rm.
One possibility, is to assume decisions are made by a majority vote of shareholders,
see for instance Hart &Moore (1996) or Renstrom & Yalcin (2003). If the rmschoice
is one-dimensional (e.g. price), it will be determined by the median shareholders
preference. However one can object to these models by arguing that, in practice,
management have more inuence than shareholders. To model this, we assume that
decisions are made by a group of individuals, which we shall refer to as the control
group. We do not make specic assumptions about the composition of the control
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group since our model does not require them. For example, the control group could
consist of the shareholders and senior management.
At present there is no widely accepted theory of the internal structure of the rm
(for recent surveys of the governance literature see Shleifer & Vishny (1997), Allen
& Gale (2000) and Tirole (2001)). For this reason we use an abstract model. We
make, what we believe to be the mild assumption, that the rms procedures respect
unanimous preferences within the control group. Such rules would include, inter alia,
those which give a major role for management.
Another major point of this paper is to emphasize the connection between tradi-
tional public economics and the theory of the rm. We can think of the rm as an
entity which provides local public goods, e.g. prots and private benets of control
to shareholders and/or employees (see Holmstrom (1999)). This establishes a con-
nection between our model of a rm and the theory of a public project in an economy
with symmetric information and real or pecuniary externalities.
Our model does not deal with asymmetric information or competing oligopolistic
rms. To incorporate asymmetric information we would require a general equilibrium
model with asymmetric information. Such models exist (see Prescott & Townsend
(2000)) but address the issues in terms of competitive clubs. Related issues, which
arise in the context of incomplete markets and oligopoly are discussed in Kelsey &
Milne (1996) and Kelsey & Milne (2003).
1.3 Organisation of the Paper
This paper aims to provide a general framework to model the internal decision-making
of rms. In section 2 we present a general equilibrium model with externalities
and/or monopoly. We begin the characterisation of equilibrium by showing that
it is independent of the choice of numeraire and that, under some conditions, it
is productively e¢ cient. It is di¢ cult to get clear comparative statics or policy
conclusions when there are multiple distortions. For this reason the two subsequent
sections consider externalities without monopoly and monopoly without externalities.
Section 3 shows a case where externalities are partially internalised within the control
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group leading to a Pareto improvement on the Walrasian equilibrium. Returning to
the monopoly problem, by similar reasoning if the control group are consumers of the
rms products and the monopolist uses uniform pricing then the price will be below
the usual monopoly price. Again the distortion is partially internalised. However this
involves cutting price to nonmembers of the control group as well, hence some prot
has been lost. The natural response is to practice price discrimination, which we study
in section 4. We show that perfect price discrimination implies Pareto e¢ ciency and
that the rms preferred pricing system can be implemented with two-part tari¤s. In
the conclusion we discuss another interpretation of our model, where the rm is a
monopsonist or externalities ow between the rm and a supplier. In particular we
consider hold-up problems within the rm. The appendix contains proofs of those
results not proved in the text.
This paper is intended to be part of a larger research programme on the theory
of the rm. The aim is that the general existence result can be used in more specic
settings to derive policy conclusions. In a companion paper, Kelsey & Milne (2003),
we consider the objective function of the rm in oligopolistic industries. We nd
similar results to those in the present paper. In addition we nd that the constitution
of the rm can inuence the equilibrium in the product market. This implies that
there will be an optimal constitution of the rm to suit the conditions it faces in
product and input markets. Hence we are able to endogenise the objective function
of the rm.
2 EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we consider a general equilibrium model with monopoly and external-
ities. We have chosen a relatively simple model to illustrate the issues, which arise
from endogenising decision-making within rms. It has been adapted from Edlin,
Epelbaum & Heller (1998) to suit our purposes. The model is not intended to be the
most general model of imperfect competition. Instead it has been chosen to study
the economic e¤ects of the internal organisation of rms.
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2.1 Model
There is a single rm with market power, rm 0, which we shall refer to as the
monopolist. There is in addition a fringe of F competitive rms, 1 6 f 6 F .
2.1.1 Markets
The model has J goods. Goods 1 to j; (j > 1) are competitive goods, while goods
j + 1 to J are monopoly goods. Thus we can write a vector of goods as x = hxc; xmi
to denote the competitive and monopoly goods separately. There are markets in all
goods. There is no market in shares. Since there is no uncertainty, diversication is
not a possible motive for trading shares. We shall use pm 2 RJ j and pc 2 Rj to
denote respectively the price vectors for monopoly goods and competitive goods. Let
p = hpc; pmi denote the price vector. Let P = RJ+ be the space of all price vectors.
We shall make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1 All economic agents including the monopolist are price-takers for
competitive goods.
This ensures that at least one market is undistorted. It is almost impossible to
derive clear policy implications in economies in which every market is distorted.
2.1.2 Firms
We require rms to satisfy the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.2 Firm f has production possibilities described by a production func-
tion f : RJ ! R; i.e. Y f = yf 2 RJ : f  yf > 0	 ; for 0 6 f 6 F . Moreover,
1. the function f is assumed to be continuous and concave;
2. f (yc; y^m + (1  ) ~ym) > f (yc; y^m) + (1  )f (yc; ~ym) ;
3. the production set, Y f ; is bounded above and non-empty;
4. 0 2 Y f :
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Let y =


y0; :::; yF

; yf 2 Y f ; denote the economys production vector and Y =

y0; :::; yF

: yf 2 Y f ; 0 6 f 6 F	 the economys production set.
Assumption 2.3 (Free Disposal) If z 2 PFf=0 Y f then  z+ 2 PFf=0 Y f ; where
z+ = hmax f0; z0g ; :::;max f0; zF gi :
This says that any unwanted outputs can be disposed of at zero cost.
Assumption 2.4 Firm f is a competitive rm for 1 6 f 6 F: These rms are price-
takers for all goods. They neither produce monopoly goods nor use them as inputs,
y = hyc; ymi 2 Y f ) ym = 0; for 1 6 f 6 F .
Firm 0 is a monopolist and is able to set the price for monopoly goods. However
it is a price-taker in the market for competitive goods. One can motivate this by
observing that, while some rms are big enough to set some prices, it is unlikely that
any given rm would have su¢ cient market power to set prices for all goods. For
instance, one would not expect Microsoft to consider the impact of its decisions on
the price of paper since it is relatively small in that market.1
It would be possible to modify our model so that price taking behaviour for
competitive goods could be derived rather than assumed. Consider an economy where
the group of competitive goods are always desired by consumers and are produced
by a competitive rm (or industry). Assume the rm(s) uses a linear technology,
which uses the numeraire as an input.2 As the commodities are always desired in
positive amounts, they will be produced and their prices will be set equal to the
constant marginal cost in terms of the numeraire. Thus these commoditiesprices
will be invariant to the monopolists decision.
2.1.3 Consumers
There are H consumers 1 6 h 6 H:We assume that the consumer h has consumption
vector xh, which lies in a consumption set Xh  RJ  Y .
1For further discussion of this assumption see Edlin et al. (1998).
2This would require appropriate modication of Assumption 2.2.
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Assumption 2.5 For all h;Xh; is bounded below, non-empty, closed, convex and
RJ+  Y  Xh; where RJ+ denotes the non-negative orthant of RJ .
Assumption 2.6 Consumer h has a utility function: uh = uh
 
xhc ; x
h
m; y

; which
is continuous in all arguments and weakly concave and increasing in


xhc ; x
h
m

and
strictly increasing in xhc .
Note we allow for possible externalities between rms and consumers.
Assumption 2.7 Individual h has endowments !hc of competitive goods, !
h
m of monopoly
goods and fh of shares in rm f; where 0 6 
f
h 6 1 and
PH
h=1 
f
h = 1: We assume
!h 2 intXh, where !h =


!hc ; !
h
m

:
Individual h has a budget constraint:
pm:x
h
m + pc:x
h
c 6 pm:!hm + pc:!hc +
FX
f=0
fhp:y
f : (1)
This generates demand functions xhm (pc; pm; y) and x
h
c (pc; pm; y) : Dene the cor-
responding aggregate demand functions, xm (pc; pm; y) =
PH
h=1 x
h
m (pc; pm; y) and
xc (pc; pm; y) =
PH
h=1 x
h
c (pc; pm; y) :
Denition 2.1 Dene vh (p; y) = maxxh2Xh uh
 
xh; y

; subject to (1). The function
vh represents individual hs induced preferences over the production plans and pricing
decisions of the rms.
2.1.4 FirmsDecisions
As already argued, it is not desirable to assume that the monopolist maximises prot.
In addition, since there are externalities between the competitive rms and their
shareholders, the Fisher Separation Theorem does not apply to them either. Instead
of prot maximisation we assume that rm f can be represented as maximising a
preference relation <f ; dened on P  Y: Hence, in general, rms preferences may
depend on the price vector and the output of all rms. This binary relation will arise
from some process of aggregation of the preferences of the control group. In this
section we describe the properties of this relation.
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We assume that the decisions of rm f are made by a group of individuals Cf 
f1; :::;Hg, which we shall refer to as the control group of rm f: Our results do not
depend crucially on the composition of the control group, hence we do not need to
be more specic. We assume that the rms preferences depend on the preferences of
the control group hvhih2Cf and shareholdings f1 ; :::; fH . Note that we do not exclude
the possibility that individuals, who are not shareholders (e.g. managers), are able
to inuence the rms preferences. We shall not model the internal decision making
of the control group explicitly but simply assume that whatever procedure is used,
respects unanimous preferences.
Assumption 2.8 For ~f 6= f^ ; C ~f \ C f^ = ;:
This says that there is no overlap between the control groups of di¤erent rms.
We make this assumption to avoid issues of collusion, which are beyond the scope of
the present paper.
Assumption 2.9 Firm fs preferences satisfy the Strong Pareto Principle i.e. 8h 2
Cf ; vh hp^; y^i > vh h~p; ~yi and 9h^ 2 Cf ; vh^ hp^; y^i > vh^ h~p; ~yi ) hp^; y^i f h~p; ~yi :
Equivalently, we are assuming there is costless Coasian bargaining within the
control group.
Assumption 2.10 The rms strict preference relation, f ; has open graph.
This is a continuity assumption and is largely technical in nature. We do not need
to assume completeness or transitivity of the rms preferences. However to prove
existence of equilibrium we need the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.11 The rms preferences satisfy

y : h~p; yi f h~p; ~yi	 is convex for
0 6 f 6 F:
Note that we only assume convexity of preferences over goods for a given price
vector. Preferences over prices are not necessarily convex. Competitive rms satisfy
the above assumptions. They maximise their preferences taking all prices and any
externalities produced by other rms as given. In contrast, rm 0 when supplying
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monopoly goods takes into account the e¤ect of its decisions on the price of monopoly
goods and any externalities produced by other rms. In addition we assume that the
preferences of the monopolist are acyclic.
Denition 2.2 A binary relation < on a set X is said to be acyclic if there do not
exist x1; :::; xn 2 X such that xi  xi+1 for 1 6 i 6 n  1 and xn  x1:
Assumption 2.12 The preferences of the monopolist, rm 0, 0 are acyclic.
As is well known from the social choice literature, group preferences are likely
to be incomplete or intransitive or both, (see for instance Sen (1970)). Because of
this, we do not assume completeness and/or transitivity.3 However we do assume
acyclcity. This is a weaker assumption than transitivity, which enables us to avoid
the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, see Sen (1977).4 For some examples of decision
procedures for rms, which satisfy our assumptions see Kelsey & Milne (1996).
2.2 Existence
Next we shall dene and demonstrate existence of equilibrium. Although all trade
takes place at a single moment of time, the model is formally sequential. First the
monopolist, rm 0, chooses a vector of monopoly goods. Secondly there is trade
in competitive goods. At the second stage all agents including the monopolist take
prices as given. The vector of monopoly goods is treated as part of the shareholders
endowment. The second stage is a competitive equilibrium with non-standard prefer-
ences as in Shafer & Sonnenschein (1975). The monopolist chooses the initial vector
of monopoly goods to achieve its most preferred equilibrium at the second stage.5
3Social choice problems may not be as great as they appear at rst sight. Hansmann (1996) argues
that the control groups of rms have relatively homogenous preferences. Hence the assumption of
unrestricted domain, commonly used in social choice theory, may not hold in this context. This
is true both of conventional investor-controlled rms and of various kinds of non-prot rms and
cooperatives.
4The rms problem is one of making a choice. In this respect it di¤ers from the Arrow problem of
making a social welfare judgement. Arrow required all social alternatives to be ranked. In contrast
making a choice merely requires selecting a best element from a set of alternatives. The weaker
condition of acyclicity is su¢ cient for the latter problem but not the former.
5A model with a similar sequential structure is used in Cornwall (1977).
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First we take the output of monopoly goods as exogenous and dene an equilib-
rium for the competitive sector of the economy.
Denition 2.3 An equilibrium


x; y0c ; y 0; pjy0m

relative to a vector of monopoly
goods, y0m; consists of an allocation x
, a vector of production plans for competitive
rms y 0; a vector of competitive goods, y0c for the monopolist and a price vector
p; such that:
1.
PH
h=1 x

h 6
PH
h=1 !h +


y0c ; y0m

+
PF
f=1 y
f ;
2. xi maximises ui
 
xi; y
0; y 0

; subject to p:xi 6 p:!h+0hp:y0+
PF
f=1 
f
hp
:yf ;
3. there does not exist y^f 2 Y f such that 
y^f ; y f ; p f 
yf ; y f ; p ; for
1 6 f 6 F ;6
4. there does not exist y^c such that
 
y^0c ; y
0
m
 2 Y 0 and 
 y^0c ; y0m ; y 0; p f
 
y0c ; y0m

; y 0; p

:
The vector of monopoly goods, y0m; is taken as given and the consumers, compet-
itive rms and even the monopolist trade competitive goods taking prices as given.
This makes precise the sense in which the monopolist is a price taker for competitive
goods. For any given y0m; there may be one equilibrium, many equilibria or none.
Denition 2.4 A managerial equilibrium hx; y; pi consists of an allocation, x, a
production plan for each rm y; and a price vector p; such that:
1.


x; y 0; pjy0m

is an equilibrium relative to y0;
2. there does not exist h~x; ~y; ~pi such that:
(a)


~x; ~y 0; ~pj~y0m

is an equilibrium relative to ~y0m;
(b)

 
~y0c ; ~y
0
m

; ~y 0; ~p
 0 
 y0c ; y0m  ; y 0; p :
If y0m gives rise to multiple equilibria, we assume that the monopolist can choose its
preferred equilibrium. In our opinion this is a reasonable way to model a monopolist
6As usual, y f denotes the production vector of all rms other than f:
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with power to set prices. The concept of prot maximisation is not well-dened as
the Fisher Separation Theorem fails (for more detail see Milne (1981)). The following
example indicates the problem.
Example 1 Consider an economy with two consumers and two commodities. Each
has the non-negative orthant in R2 as a consumption set and owns half the total
endowment and production set. The production set is closed and convex. Thus both
consumers have identical budget sets given any choice of y. However, since they have
di¤erent preferences, they can have di¤erent rankings of the production vectors with
price making by the monopolist, (see gure 1).
Theorem 2.1 Provided consumers satisfy Assumptions 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, the mo-
nopolist satises 2.12 and all rms satisfy Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and
2.11, a managerial equilibrium exists.
2.3 Choice of Numeraire
If rms maximise prot and there is imperfect competition, the real equilibrium will
depend on the choice of numeraire or more generally the price normalisation rule, see
for instance Böhm (1994). The intuition is clear: in a pure exchange economy, if one
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individual was given an objective, which depended on the numeraire, then changes
in the numeraire could change the real equilibrium. A similar problem arises in an
economy with production, if the rms objective is to maximise prots in terms of
the numeraire.
This problem does not arise in our model, since production decisions are based on
utility maximisation by individuals. Hence the rm has a real objective. For instance,
suppose that decisions of the rm are made by a majority vote of shareholders. Each
one will have preferences which only depend on real consumption, hence the rms
decisions and consequently the equilibrium will be independent of the numeraire.
Below we show that with our denition, equilibrium is independent of the numeraire.
Proposition 2.1 The set of managerial equilibria does not depend on the choice of
numeraire.
This result follows from the sequential structure of our model. The second stage is
a competitive equilibrium with non-standard preferences and hence is independent of
the numeraire for the usual reasons. At the rst stage the monopolist chooses his/her
production plan. As explained above this decision depends only on real variables and
hence is also independent of the numeraire.
2.4 Productive E¢ ciency
Here we show that monopoly is productively e¢ cient even if it does not necessarily
maximise prot. To do this we need to assume that there are no externalities.
Assumption 2.13 There are no externalities, i.e. uh
 
xhc ; x
h
m; y

= uh
 
xhc ; x
h
m; 0

for all y 2 Y and 1 6 h 6 H:
Proposition 2.2 Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 2.9, and 2.13 the equilibrium
will be productively e¢ cient.
Proposition 2.2, shows that although the Fisher Separation Theorem does not
apply, all shareholders will approve a change, which reduces costs while leaving output
unchanged. Consider a point which is productively ine¢ cient. Then the monopolist
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could directly supply output of competitive goods to shareholders in proportion to
their shareholdings. Since the original position is productively ine¢ cient, for a small
increase, this is possible while leaving the rms other net trades unchanged. This
implies that the rms prots are unchanged. As shareholders are price-takers for
competitive goods this will be perceived as making them all better o¤.
The following example shows that if the rm is not a price-taker in at least one
input market, then an owner-manager may choose to be productively ine¢ cient.
Example 2 Ine¢ cient and E¢ cient Monopoly Consider an economy with
two consumers A and B; who have utility functions over two commodities, ui(x1i; x2i);
where i = A;B. Assume that consumer A has an endowment of an input L and wholly
owns a production technology, where the input produces commodity 1 via a neoclassical
production function f(`). Consumer B has an endowment of commodity 2.
We can construct an Edgeworth Box, where the height is commodity 2 and the
length is commodity 1. By varying the amount of ` that consumer A puts into the
rm she can alter the dimensions of the box. Assume that consumer As rm is a
monopoly supplier of commodity 1. It is possible that by reducing her input of ` and
freely disposing of the remainder she can make herself better o¤, if relative prices
move su¢ ciently in her favour, see gure 2.7
Alternatively, consider As rm to be a perfect price discriminator, where A sets
a non-linear price schedule that curves around the indi¤erence curve through Bs
endowment. Assuming that A supplies inputs ` = L, then we have a standard result,
that the allocation is Pareto e¢ cient. All the gains from trade are obtained by A.
Consumer B is indi¤erent between trading or merely consuming his endowment of
commodity 2. Clearly, in this case A will not reduce her input below L because that
will reduce her welfare. Price discrimination is considered in more detail in section 4,
where we show more generally that it can lead to e¢ cient outcomes. The reason for
the ine¢ ciency of the rst case is induced by the monopolistic distortion in prices,
which in turn implies ine¢ ciency in input supply.
7This is an example, in reverse, of the classical immiserising growth argument in international
trade, see Dixit & Norman (1980), Ch.5.
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Our result on productive e¢ ciency could, in principle, be extended to economies
with externalities. However care needs to be taken over the appropriate denition of
productive e¢ ciency. The externalities need to be taken into account when dening
e¢ ciency. Consider a situation with two rms, call them rm A and rm B. These
rms are otherwise similar except that rm B produces twice as much pollution per
unit of output compared to rm A. Intuitively, e¢ ciency requires that rm B should
not produce. This could be achieved by counting pollution as an input into the
production process. However proceeding in this direction may create problems. In
the present paper, each consumer potentially gets an externality from the use of every
physical commodity by every rm. Hence we would need a new good for the e¤ect
of each output or input of each rm on every individual. A total of J (F + 1)H new
goods. However with such a large number of goods, productive e¢ ciency is a very
weak criterion. It could be criticised as merely saying each process is an e¢ cient way
of producing itself. For further discussion of productive e¢ ciency and externalities
see Sen (1973).
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3 EXTERNALITIES
This section presents a special case of the previous model, where there are externalities
but no monopoly power. In this case we show a non-prot maximising rm produces
less than the prot-maximising level of negative externalities. A similar result was
proved in a partial equilibrium context by Roemer (1993), who showed that pollution
would be reduced if a rmsdecisions were made by majority voting. We extend this
to general equilibrium and to any decision rule which respects unanimity. Our model
is also di¤erent because it has multiple rms and variable labour supply. By similar
reasoning we may show that a non-prot maximising rm will produce more positive
externalities than a prot maximising rm.
3.1 Model
There are two traded goods, a consumption good y and labour L: In addition there
is a negative externality, e.g. pollution z; which is not traded but enters into the
utility and production functions. We shall normalise the price of y to 1. The price
of labour is denoted by w: In order to focus on the e¤ect of externalities, throughout
this section we shall assume that all rms are price-takers.
Consumers
Assumption 3.1 There are H consumers, 1 6 h 6 H: Individual h has utility
function: uh = yh   ch  `h   Dh PFf=1 dh  zf ; where ch0 > 0; ch00 > 0; Dh0 >
0; Dh00 > 0; dh0 > 0; dh00 > 0 and zf denotes the level of externality produced by rm
f: Consumer h has an endowment `h of labour.
This utility function has two familiar special cases. First where the externality
is a pure public bad, uh = yh   ch  `h   Dh PFf=1 zf : Secondly where utility
is additively separable between the externalities produced by di¤erent rms, uh =
yh  ch  `h PFf=1 dh  zf : Since utility is quasi-linear, the aggregate labour supply
can be written in the form LS = LS (w) :
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Firms There are F identical rms, which produce the consumption good from
labour according to the production function y = g (L; z) ; where g is C2 strictly
concave and increasing in both arguments. Firms are assumed to be price-takers
on both input and output markets. We assume that all rms use the same decision
rule. No assumptions are imposed on this rule other than that it respects unanimity.
Individuals are not, however, assumed to be identical. Hence the rm faces a non-
trivial collective choice problem. To preserve symmetry, we require that consumers
all su¤er the same disutility from the externalities produced by any given rm.
All individuals are assumed to have an equal number of shares in each rm.
We assume that individuals do not coordinate their voting across di¤erent rms.
Thus they cannot implement a collusive outcome by reducing output at all rms
simultaneously.8 We shall only consider symmetric equilibria.
Theorem 3.1 For any decision rule which satises unanimity, in symmetric equi-
librium, there will less than the prot-maximising level of negative externality.
Although we have shown unambiguous results, the reader will have noticed that
we required strong assumptions on preferences and production. This should not be
surprising as we are dealing with an abstract second best setting, where apparently
perverse comparative static results can occur. To see this more clearly, observe that
our prot-maximising model above can be thought of as an economy, where there are
no Lindahl prices for externalities. In contrast the non-prot maximising rm has
marginal conditions that mimic Lindahl prices for externalities owing to the control
group. Thus our problem is comparing distorted and less distorted economies, neither
of which are rst best.
Consider a partial equilibrium world, where the output and input prices are held
constant. If a rm is faced with additional Lindahl shadow prices for the externality
from the control group, it will reduce output of a negative externality, for the usual
8This may be rigorously justied in a model with many types of consumer, where all consumers
of a given type have the same preferences and endowment of goods. The distribution of shares over
types is the same for all rms. However no individual owns shares in more than one rm, hence there
is no possibility for coordinating voting between di¤erent rms.
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revealed preference reasons. This intuitive result requires no feedback e¤ects through
prices induced from the general equilibrium conditions. It is these e¤ects that can
overturn the partial equilibrium intuition. However in general equilibrium strong
assumptions are needed since it is di¢ cult to get clear comparative static results
when agents actions are strategic substitutes. We have assumed that if one rm
pollutes more this reduces the marginal benet of polluting, hence externalities are
strategic substitutes. This seems a natural assumption if the externality is pollution.
The marginal damage of pollution is thought to be increasing in many environmental
problems. However, while realistic, it is di¢ cult to establish general comparative
static results with this assumption. Comparative statics could be established with
less restrictive assumptions if externalities were strategic complements, (see Milgrom
& Roberts (1990), Milgrom & Shannon (1994)).
3.2 Expanding The Control Group
Our preceding observations on Second Best results, imply that it is di¢ cult to make
unqualied assertions about the welfare implications of expanding the control group.
For example, in a related literature in incomplete asset markets it is well-known (see
Hart (1975), Milne & Shefrin (1987)) that introducing more markets for asset trading
can be welfare reducing.9
Therefore an increase in the control group, that moves the economy from one sec-
ond best equilibrium to another, could, in principal, have any welfare result. Clearly
if the original control group can choose to add or veto the addition of new mem-
bers, they will only introduce members that enhance the welfare of both old and new
members. Notice that our non-prot model allows for transfers, so that new members
could compensate existing ones for the benets of entry. In an abstract way this en-
capsulates the bargaining that occurs in takeovers and mergers, where side-payments
and conditions are negotiated by shareholders, management and key employees.
One deciency is that there is no obvious limit to the size of the control group.
It could be possible to include all agents in an e¢ cient allocation for the economy
9Other examples of counter-intuitive comparative statics occur in international trade, taxation
etc. and are well known in the public economics literature (see La¤ont (1988)).
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and compensate potential losers. In short, the control group would be equivalent to
some e¢ cient, all inclusive planning agency. Clearly this is unrealistic as we have
omitted any costs of bargaining within the rm or with potential new members of
the control group. Thus we could allow for bargaining costs that rise with the size
of the control group. This cost, limiting the size of the control group, is similar to
crowding or congestion costs in the theory of clubs, where such costs limit the size
and composition of clubs.10
4 PRICE DISCRIMINATION
In this section we consider a variant of the model of section 2, where there is monopoly
power but no externalities. By similar reasoning to that used in the previous section,
we may show that if a monopolist practices uniform pricing it will set a price below the
prot-maximising level. This will happen if control group members are also consumers
of the rms output. Starting at the prot maximising level, a price reduction has
a second order e¤ect on prots but a rst order e¤ect on the consumer surplus. We
shall not discuss this in detail since there is already a fairly large literature on the case
where consumers wholly or partially control a uniform pricing monopolist. (See, for
instance, Farrell (1985), Hart & Moore (1996), Kelsey & Milne (2003) and Renstrom
& Yalcin (2003)).
When a uniform pricing monopolist reduces the price, those within the rm gain
consumer surplus. However cutting price reduces the prots, which can be made from
non-members of the control group. This suggests that the rm would like to practice
price discrimination, selling at marginal cost to members of the control group, while
charging outsiders a higher price. In practice, discounts for sta¤ are common and
discounts for shareholders are not unknown. Hence there is a case for investigating
price discrimination with non-prot maximising rms. We focus on the extreme case
10There are obvious parallels with our theory of the rm and club theory, see Prescott & Townsend
(2000) for an explicit connection in a general equilibrium model with asymmetric information. See
Cornes & Sandler (1996), for a survey; and Conley & Wooders (2001) and Ellickson, Grodal, Scotch-
mer & Zame (1999) for recent formulations of endogenous clubs embedded in a private market
system.
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of perfect price discrimination. Our main results are that, the outcome will be Pareto
optimal and can be implemented by two-part tari¤s. This extends some results of
Edlin et al. (1998) from prot maximisation to general objective functions for the
rm.
4.1 Model
The model is similar to that of section 2, the main modications being that we
assume no externalities and allow the monopolist to price discriminate. For perfect
price discrimination to be possible it is necessary that households should not be able
to trade in the goods it produces. Hence we shall require that no individual has
any endowment of monopoly goods in this section. Moreover individuals are not
able to trade monopoly goods among themselves, hence there are no resale prices
for these goods. This enables us to prove e¢ ciency of the equilibrium. To apply
calculus techniques, the utility function is C2; the production function is C1 and
both functions satisfy appropriate Inada conditions.
4.1.1 Consumers
Consumers satisfy Assumption 2.6. Let Rh be the total amount which individual
h pays for monopoly goods. Individual hs income, net of payment to the rm is
Ih = pc:!
h Rh: To prove existence we need to make an additional assumption, which
says that the rm is the only source of monopoly goods. This will be a maintained
hypothesis throughout this section.
Assumption 4.1 All individuals have zero endowment of monopoly goods, !hm = 0;
for 1 6 h 6 H:
Consumer h has utility function uh
 
xc; x
h
m; y

dened over competitive and mono-
poly goods and possibly externalities from the rms. Individual hs budget constraint
for competitive goods is pc:xhc 6 Ih: The rst order condition for the consumers
optimal choice of competitive goods is:
@uh
@xcj
=
@uh
@xck
=
pcj
pck
: (2)
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The solution is individual hs demand function, denoted by xhc
 
Ih; pc; y

.
Denition 4.1 Dene the indirect utility function of individual h by, V h
 
xhm; R
h; pc; y

=
maxxc u
h
 
xc; x
h
m; y

such that pc:xc 6 pc:!h  Rh:
By denition; V h
 
xhm; R
h; pc; y

= uh
 
xc (I; pc; y) ; x
h
m; y

; hence @V
h
@I =
P @uh
@xcj
@xcj
@I :
Substituting from (2), @V
h
@I =
1
pck
@uh
@xck
P
pcj
@xcj
@I : By di¤erentiating the budget con-
straint we obtain,
P
pcj
@xcj
@I = 1: Hence:
pck
@V h
@I
=
@uh
@xck
: (3)
Dene uh (pc) = maxxc u
h (xc; 0; y) such that pc:xc 6 pc:!h: Thus uh (pc) is the
reservation utility, which consumer h can obtain if (s)he does not trade with the
monopolist. Since we assume that the monopolist is a price-taker for competitive
goods, uh (pc) can be taken as given by him/her.
4.1.2 Monopolist
The monopolist satises Assumption 2.1. We retain the assumption of symmetric in-
formation, hence there are no incentive compatibility problems. As usual, we can re-
strict attention to take it or leave it o¤ers. The rm o¤ers to supply individual h with
a bundle xhm of monopoly goods in exchange for (gross) payment R
h: Since the monop-
olist implements unanimous preferences of the control group, the outcome can repre-
sented locally by maximising a weighted sum,
PM
h=1 
huh; of their utilities for some
non-negative weights h: We may normalise the s by requiring
PM
h=1 
hh = 1:11
Hence, we may represent the rms behaviour as the solution to the following opti-
misation problem. Choose hR; xm; yci to maximise
PM
h=1 
hV h
 
Rh; xhm; pc

subject
to the constraints:
V h

Rh; xhm; pc

= uh (pc) ; for M + 1 6 h 6 H;

X
xhm; yc

= 0;
HX
h=1
Rh + pc:yc = 0; (4)
11This is only a local representation of the rms preferences and does not imply that they are
globally complete or transitive.
21
where xm =


x1m; :::; x
H
m

and R =


R1; :::; RH

: The rst constraint says that non-
members of the control group must achieve at least as much utility as they could
obtain by not trading with the rm. The second restricts the rm to using feasible
production plans. The nal constraint is the rms budget balance condition. The
Lagrangian for the rms optimisation problem is:
L =
MX
h=1
hV h

Rh; xhm; pc; y

+
HX
h=M+1
h
h
V h

Rh; xhm; pc; y

  uh (pc)
i
+
X
xhm; yc

+ 
 
HX
h=1
Rh + pc:yc
!
: (5)
4.2 Equilibrium
Below we modify our denition of equilibrium to allow for price discrimination. As
before we consider an economy which is formally sequential. First the monopolist
chooses a prole of take it or leave it o¤ers hR; xmi : Then all agents including the
monopolist trade competitive goods taking prices as given.
Denition 4.2 A equilibrium given hR; xmi consists of allocations of competitive
goods, a vector, yc ; of competitive goods and a price vector for competitive goods,
hxc ; yc ; ym; pci ; such that:
1. yc +
PH
h=1 x
h
c =
PH
h=1 !
h;
2. uh
 
xhc ; xhm

> uh
 
xhc ; x
h
m

; for all xhc such that p

c :x
h
c 6 pc :!h   Rh; for
1 6 h 6 H;
3. uh
 
xhc ; xhm

> uh (pc) for 1 6 h 6 H:
Denition 4.3 A PDM (price discriminating monopoly) equilibrium consists of a
prole of take it or leave it o¤ers, allocations of competitive goods, a production plan
and a price vector for competitive goods, hR; xc ; xm; yc ; ym; pci ; such that:
1. hxc ; yc ; ym; pci is an equilibrium given hR; xmi ;
2. hR; xm; yc ; ymi solves the rms optimisation problem (4);
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Theorem 4.1 Given consumers satisfy Assumptions 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 4.1 and rms
satisfy Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11 and 2.10; a PDM equilibrium exists.
Proof. Given xm and R, which satisfy the participation constraint, we can apply the
same type of argument as Lemma A.3 to show there exists a pair hR; xmi ; for which
the competitive sector of the economy has an equilibrium. As before we may show
that the set of equilibria contingent on hR; xmi is closed. Since the set of attainable
allocations is compact, we may assume that R and x are chosen from compact sets.
Since the monopolists feasible production set is compact and his/her objective is
continuous, Lemma A.2 guarantees the existence of a maximum and thus a PDM
equilibrium.
4.3 E¢ ciency
We shall now demonstrate that the equilibrium is e¢ cient and can be implemented by
a 2-part tari¤, which consists of a personalised hook-up fee and a per unit price equal
to marginal cost. Intuitively, total surplus can be maximised by setting price equal
to marginal cost. Since surplus is maximised, the resulting equilibrium is e¢ cient.
Denition 4.4 We say that the rm uses marginal cost pricing if it sets a tar-
i¤, Rh = T h
 
xhm

= th + pm:x
h
m; where pm =
D
pc1
@
@ym1
= @@y1 ; :::; pc1
@
@ymn
= @@y1
E
and
T h
 
xhm

denotes the total amount consumer h pays for quantity xhm.
To prove e¢ ciency we need to assume that there are no externalities. Henceforth
we shall suppress the dependence of u on y:
Theorem 4.2 If Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.13 are satised a PDM
equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient and can be implemented by a 2-part tari¤, in which the
monopolist uses marginal cost pricing.12
12This result does not hold if the rm is not a price-taker for competitive goods. The reasoning
is the same as for a conventional monopolist. Starting at the e¢ cient quantities, a small change in
quantity will have a rst order e¤ect on prices in the competitive sector but only a second order
e¤ect on prots. Typically there will be a direction of change which will make all members of the
control group better-o¤.
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This result may have some applications for regulation. Regulated (or nationalised)
rms are unlikely to maximise prot. It may be useful to know that their preferred
pricing structure will consist of a two-part tari¤. It is not surprising that the rm will
wish to present outsiders with a 2-part tari¤, since this pricing scheme is capable of
extracting all their surplus. The rm also wishes to use a 2-part tari¤ with members
of the control group. The reason is that, within the control group, it is desirable to
allocate goods e¢ ciently by using marginal cost pricing. Any redistribution between
control group members can be achieved in a lump-sum manner by adjusting the hook-
up fees. To clarify, for non-members of the control group the hook-up fee is equal
to the total surplus. For the control group, the hook-up fee is not necessarily equal
to total consumer surplus. Instead it is determined by a bargaining process or game
within the control group.
An example of such bargaining would be partnerships in accounting or law rms
where salaries and bonuses are determined by various formulae and bargaining in the
group. Observe that such rms have partners (members of the control group) and
non-partners. We have not modelled the determination of the control group. For
further discussion see section 3.2.
5 CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of prot maximisation has been criticised both on empirical and
theoretical grounds. Although we have found that there are a number of di¤erences
between prot maximising and non-prot maximising rms, we have also shown that
some well-known results are independent of the objective of the rm. This suggests
that many existing results on economics of rms and industries do not crucially
depend on prot maximisation.
These arguments provide a possible rationale for controls on foreign ownership
and may explain popular suspicion of foreign owned rms. If the control group of a
foreign owned rm does not su¤er externalities in the domestic economy, then such a
rm would produce the prot-maximising level of externalities. By similar reasoning,
monopolistic distortions would also be worse in a foreign owned rm. Hence there
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may be a case for regulating foreign owned rms more strictly. Even within a single
country, there may be reasons for preferring relatively small locally owned rms to
large national companies. Similarly our analysis of pollution problems, suggests that
there may be advantages in having waste disposed of close to its place of production.
This increases the chance that, those a¤ected by negative externalities, will have some
inuence on the rms decision.
So far the paper has emphasised the involvement of consumers in rmsdecisions.
But our theory is symmetric, so that we could assume the rm is a monopsonist in
some input markets or that there are externalities owing between the rm and a
supplier of inputs. The most common examples are farm-owned marketing organi-
sations or where the rm is owned by suppliers of a particular form of labour. So
long as the rm acts competitively in all markets, except those for its own inputs,
our arguments on productive e¢ ciency continue to apply. Now let us turn to specic
cases, where the supplier of the input can be inuential in the decisions of the rm.
Assume that there are negative externalities between the rm and its suppliers.
Then, as before, a non-prot maximising rm will produce less of such externalities.
A special case of an externality arises from the hold-up problem. Assume that sup-
pliers may make rm-specic investments, which are non-contractible, e.g. in human
capital. Ex-post, the rm can appropriate these investments. This imposes a nega-
tive externality on the suppliers of inputs and hence reduces the incentive to provide
rm specic investments.
With conventional rms there will be too little rm-specic human capital in
equilibrium. However as already noted, a non-prot maximising rm will produce
fewer negative externalities. Thus the hold-up problem will be reduced, and input
suppliers will be more willing to supply rm-specic inputs, which brings about a
Pareto improvement. It would be desirable to include all the suppliers so long as
they are productive and add to the groups welfare. Observe that it is in the interest
of the control group of the rm to include agents that su¤er from the externality or
benet from the supply of rm specic human capital, given appropriate transfers.
This case relates directly to some recent papers on the theory of the rm (see
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Hart & Moore (1990), Hart & Moore (1996) and Roberts & Steen (2000), where
the initial members of the control group nd it advantageous to include suppliers
of rm specic human capital). But the general principles operate whether we are
considering externalities or suppliers of rm-specic inputs.13
APPENDIX
A Existence and E¢ ciency
This appendix contains some technical results and proofs relating to the existence of
equilibrium and productive e¢ ciency.
Lemma A.1 Let X be a nite set and let < be a reexive and acyclic binary relation
on X: Then there is a <-maximal element of X.
Proof. Choose x1 2 X arbitrarily. If there does not exist x 2 X; such that x  x1;
the proof is complete. Otherwise choose x2 2 X such that x2  x1: Dene recursively
xn+1 to be an element of X such that xn+1  xn if such an element exists. Since X
is nite and < is acyclic, this process must eventually terminate. The nal point will
be a <-maximal element of X.
To prove existence we shall need the following result, which is a generalisation of
the Weierstrass theorem.
Lemma A.2 Let X be a topological space and let < be a reexive and acyclic binary
relation on X with open lower sections. Then if K is a non-empty compact subset of
X; there exists a <-maximal element of K:
Proof. Suppose if possible that K contains no <-maximal element. Since < has
open lower sections, the sets Ox = fy : x  yg ; x 2 K; are an open cover of K: Hence
there is a nite subcover, Ox1 ; :::; Oxm : Since < is acyclic the set fx1; :::; xmg contains
13Notice that we assume that there exists an control mechanism that ensures e¢ cient production
rules. If for some reason we assume that such a mechanism cannot be used, then the control group
will be constrained to use an ine¢ cient (in the rst best sense) mechanism. This is the central
message of Bolton & Xu (1999), Hart & Moore (1990) and Roberts & Steen (2000).
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a <-maximal element. Without loss of generality assume this is x1: Then it is not
the case that xi  x1; for 1 6 i 6 m: But this implies that x1 =2 Oxi ; for 1 6 i 6 m;
which contradicts the fact that Ox1 ; :::; Oxm is an open cover of K: The result follows.
Denition A.1 Let E denote the set of ordered pairs 
y0m; p, for which there ex-
ists x 2 X; y 0 2 Y  0; and y0c such that
 
y0c ; y
0
m
 2 Y 0 and 
x; y0c ; y 0; pjy0m is a
competitive equilibrium relative to y0m:
Lemma A.3 Given that consumers satisfy Assumptions 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, rms sat-
isfy Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9, 2.11 and 2.10; E is non-empty and closed.
Proof. Consider the case where y0m = 0: Then one can show an equilibrium exists
by adapting the proof of Theorem 7.21 of Ellickson (1993). This result requires the
production and consumption sets to be compact, however it may be adapted to our
model as follows. Consider a sequence of truncated economies, where the production
and consumption sets are bounded, such that the bounds tend to innity as n!1.
Let


xn; y
0
cn; y
 0
n ; pnjy0mn

be the sequence of equilibria of the truncated economies.
The attainable set is compact. By taking convergent subsequences, if necessary,
we may assume that xn; y0cn; y
 0
n ; pn and y
0
mn converge to limits x; y
0
c ; y
 0; p and y0m
respectively.
We claim that


x; y0c ; y
 0; pjy0m

is a competitive equilibrium relative to y0m. Since
the consumption and production sets are closed, x and y are feasible. As
PH
h=1 xnh 6PH
h=1 !h+
 
y0cn; y
0
mn

+y 0n ; for all n;
PH
h=1 xh 6
PH
h=1 !h+
 
y0c ; y
0
m

+y 0: Suppose,
if possible, there exists yf 2 Y f such that 
p; yf ; y f f 
p; yf ; y f ; for 0 6 f 6 F:
Since the graph of f is open there exists  > 0 such that if kp  pk < ; ky   zk < 
and

yf ; y f  w <  then hp; wi f hp; zi : For all su¢ ciently large n, kpn   pk <
; kyn   yk <  and

yf ; y f  Dyf ; y fn E <  hence Dpn; yf ; y fn E f Dpn; yfn; y fn E :
However this contradicts the fact that rm f is maximising its preferences in the equi-
librium hxn; yn; pni : A similar argument shows in hx; y; pi consumers are maximising
their preferences. It follows that hx; y; pi 2 E .
Now to demonstrate that E is closed. Let 
~y0mn; ~pn be a sequence of points
from E , which converges to a limit 
~y0m; ~p : Let ~yn and ~xn denote the corresponding
27
vectors of equilibrium production and prices. By taking convergent subsequences, if
necessary, we may assume that ~yn and ~xn converge to limits ~y and ~x respectively. By
a similar argument to that above we may show that


~x; ~y0c ; ~y
 0; ~pj~y0m

is a competitive
equilibrium relative to ~y0m, which establishes that E is closed.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 If we normalise prices to lie in the unit simplex, the set
E is bounded and therefore compact. Proposition A.2 implies that < has a maximum
over this set. It is easy to check that such a maximum is a managerial equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 An equilibrium for a given level of output y0 is a
competitive equilibrium in a particular exchange economy. Since the set of competi-
tive equilibria does not depend on the price normalisation, it follows that the set of
competitive equilibria relative to a given output y0 is also independent of it. Thus, for
any given numeraire, the rm will have the same set of price-quantity combinations
to choose from. Since the rms preferences are dened over real variables, it will
choose the same quantities. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.2 The usual necessary condition for productive e¢ -
ciency is that all rms are on their production frontiers and that all rms have equal
marginal rates of transformation between any pair of goods. (Or that appropriate in-
equalities are satised at points where the production function is not di¤erentiable.)
Since the production sets are concave these conditions are also su¢ cient for produc-
tive e¢ ciency.
As there are no externalities, the Fisher separation theorem can be applied to
the competitive rms. Unanimity implies that these rms will maximise prot. The
Fisher separation theorem can also be applied to the monopolists trades at the
second stage. Thus the second stage is a standard Walrasian equilibrium with prot-
maximising rms. For the usual reasons all rms will set their marginal rate of
transformation equal to the price ratio. (Again these are replaced by the appropriate
inequalities at points where the production function is not di¤erentiable.) Thus the
rst order conditions for productive e¢ ciency are satised for competitive goods.
Moreover the competitive rms will be producing on their production frontiers.
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It remains to demonstrate that the monopolist operates on his/her production
frontier. Let y^0 =


y^0c ; y^
0
m

be the equilibrium output of rm 0: Suppose, if possible,
that there exists ~y0c such that 
f


~y0c ; y^
0
m

> 0 and ~y0c < y^0c : By Assumption 2.6,
the equilibrium prices of competitive goods are strictly positive. Then if p^ denotes
the equilibrium price vector and ~y0 =


~y0c ; y^
0
m

; p^:
 
~y0   y^0 > 0: By assumption,
agents are price-takers for competitive goods. The two production plans y^0 and ~y0
only di¤er in the components referring to competitive goods. Hence if the surplus of
p^:
 
~y0   y^0 is divided among all members of the control group so that each receives
a positive amount, the change will be perceived as giving all of them a larger budget
set. Thus they will all be better o¤ and consequently such a change will be approved
by any decision rule which satises the Pareto principle. Thus we may conclude that
there does not exist ~y0c such that 
f


~y0c ; y^
0
m

> 0 and ~y0c < y^0c :
Let y^0 denote the equilibrium output of rm 0: Suppose if possible, that there
exists ~y0 such that 0
 
~y0

> 0 and ~y0 > y^0: From above we must have ~y0c = y^0c :
Consider y0 = (1  ) ~y0 + y^0: By Assumption 2.2, 0
 
y0

> 0; for 0 <  < 1: By
continuity 0
 
y0   "e1

> 0; for some " > 0: However if  is su¢ ciently close to 1
and " is su¢ ciently close to 0, y0  "e1 > y^0 and y0  "e1 has a smaller component 1
than y^0: This contradicts the previous paragraph and hence the result follows.
B Externality Model
This appendix contains the proof of the comparative statics result for our exter-
nality model. In symmetric equilibrium with prot-maximising rms the following
conditions are satised:
gL

L^; z^

= w^; (6)
gz

L^; z^

= 0; (7)
FL^ = LS (w^) ; (8)
where gL denotes
@g
@L etc. Equations (6) and (7) are respectively the rst order
conditions for prot maximising choice of pollution and labour input, while equation
(8) is the labour-market equilibrium condition.
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As explained in section 4.1.2, we may represent the non-prot maximising rms
choice of inputs as maximising a weighted sum of utilities of control group members.
Hence it may be characterised by the solution to the following optimisation problem:
max
MX
h=1
huh =
MX
h=1
hh
h
g

Lf ; zf

  wLf
i
 
MX
h=1
hDh
0@ FX
j=1
dh
 
zj
1A ; (9)
subject to Lf > 0; zf > 0:14
Proof of Theorem 3.1 Consider the following problem,
max
L;z
8<:g Lf ; zf  wLf   
MX
h=1
hDh
0@ FX
j=1
dh
 
zj
1A9=; : (10)
If  = 0; the solution to (10) gives the prot maximising values of Lfand zf ; while if
 = 1 this is the non-prot maximising rms optimisation problem.
The rst order conditions for (10) are:
gL

Lf ; zf

= w; (11)
gz

Lf ; zf

= 
MX
h=1
hDh0
0@ FX
j=1
dh
 
zj
1A dh0 zf : (12)
The Hessian of this problem is H =
0@ gLL gLz
gLz gzz   
1A ; where

 
zf

=
PM
h=1 
hDh00
PF
j=1 d
h
 
zj

dh0
 
zf
2
+
PM
h=1 
hDh0
PF
j=1 d
h
 
zj

dh00
 
zf

:
The second order condition is that H must be negative semi denite at the optimum,
which implies that its determinant must be positive, hence
gLL (gzz   )  (gLz)2 > 0: (13)
We shall look for a symmetric equilibrium, where Lf = L () ; zf = z () for
1 6 f 6 F: The conditions for such an equilibrium are:
gL (L; z) = w; (14)
gz (L; z) =  (z) ; (15)
FL = LS (w) ; (16)
14We do not need to consider corner solutions where Lf = zf = 0; since in this case, it is trivially
true that the rm produces less pollution than the prot maximising level.
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where  (z) =
PM
h=1 hD
0
h (Fdh (z)) d
0
h (z) : Let the symmetric solution be L () ; z () ;
w () : Substituting (14) into (16),
LS (gL (L; z)) = FL () : (17)
Di¤erentiating (15) and (17) with respect to ; we obtain:
gLzL
0 () + gzzz0 () =  0 (z) z0 () +  (z) ;
LS0 (gL (L; z))

gLLL
0 () + gLzz0 ()

= FL0 () :
Solving L0 () =  L
S0gLzz0()
LS0gLL F : Substituting  
LS0g2Lzz
0()
LS0g
LL
 F + gzzz
0 () =  0 (z) z0 () +
 (z) : Hence z0 () =  (z)[L
S0g
LL
 F ]
LS0[(gzz  0(z))gLL (gLz)2] [gzz  0(z)]
: Note that from our as-
sumptions on the derivatives of D, d and g we have,
 0 (z) = F
PM
h=1 
hDh00
 
Fdh (z)

dh0 (z)2 +
PM
h=1 
hDh0
 
Fdh (z)

dh00 > 0;  (z) >
0; LS0gLL   F < 0 and gzz    0 (z) < 0:
Since,  (z) =
PM
h=1 
hDh00
 
Fdh (z)

dh0 (z)2 +
PM
h=1 
hDh0
 
Fdh (z)

dh00 (z), in
symmetric equilibrium  0 (z) >  (z) : From the second order condition, gLL (gzz   ) 
(gLz)
2 > 0; hence gLL
 
gzz    0
  (gLz)2 > 0: Therefore z0 () < 0: Letting  vary
between 0 and 1, shows that, in the equilibrium, pollution is below the prot max-
imising level. 15
C Price Discrimination
Proof of Theorem 4.2 Let hx; y; p; Ri be a PDM-equilibrium. The rst
order conditions for the rms optimisation problem are,
h
@V h
@xhmj
+ 
@
@ymj
= 0 for 1 6 h 6 H; j + 1 6 j 6 J ; (18)
 h@V
h
@Ih
+  = 0 for 1 6 h 6 H; (19)

@
@ycj
+ pcj = 0; for 1 6 j 6 j: (20)
By the envelope theorem, @V
h
@xhmj
= @u
h
@xhmj
: From (3), (18), (19), and (20),
@uh
@xhmj
=
@uh
@xhc1
=
@uk
@xkmj
=
@uk
@xkc1
; for 1 6 h; k 6 H; j + 1 6 j 6 J: (21)
15We would like to thank Les Reinhorn for his comments on this proof.
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From the consumers rst order condition,
@uh
@xhcj
=
@uh
@xhc1
=
@uk
@xkcj
=
@uk
@xhc1
; for 1 6 h; k 6 H; 1 6 j 6 j: (22)
From (19), pck
@
@yck
= 
h
pck
@uh
@xhck
: From (18),  @@ymj =  h @u
h
@xhmj
: Dividing
@
@ymj
=
@
@yck
=   @u
h
@xhmj
=
@uh
@xck
; (23)
which implies that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of
transformation. By (20),
@
@ycj
=
@
@yc`
=
pcj
pc`
: (24)
By concavity, (21), (22), (23) and (24) are su¢ cient conditions for Pareto optimality.
Implementation by 2-Part Tari¤s Now assume that the rm o¤ers consumers
the 2-part tari¤, T h
 
xhm

= th+pm:x
h
m; where pm =
D
pc1
@
@ym1
= @@yc1 ; :::; pc1
@
@ymn
= @@yc1
E
:
The consumers rst-order condition is:
@uh
@xhmj
=
@uh
@xck
=
pmj
pck
=  
pc1
@
@ymj
= @@yc1
pck
=  
@
@ymj
@
@yck
; (25)
where the third equality follows from equation (20). Since (25) is equivalent to (23)
the PDM equilibrium can be implemented by the 2-part tari¤.
The above proof assumes that there are no competitive rms. However, it can be
adapted to allow for the presence of competitive rms.
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